VIFC Steering Committee Dissolved as MoF Gets August Deadline on Structure

Vietnam's Prime Minister has abolished the VIFC Steering Committee, consolidated authority in the Executive Council under Deputy PM Nguyen Van Thang, and given the Ministry of Finance until August to answer the VIFC's most consequential structural question: one executive body or two. The conclusions, drawn from PM Le Minh Hung's June 2, 2026 meeting and published by a Government Office notice shortly after, put institutions evaluating VIFC entry on notice that the centre's basic organizational architecture remains unsettled — and will be resolved before the end of Q3 2026.

Steering Committee Abolished#

The VIFC previously operated under a dual-body structure: an Executive Council handling operational decisions and a Steering Committee performing coordination functions above it. Critics had identified that arrangement as a source of delay — two bodies with overlapping mandates, both capable of creating friction at the point where decisions needed to move.

PM Le Minh Hung's June 2 conclusions end that arrangement. The Steering Committee is discontinued; its functions transfer in full to the Executive Council. The governance chain now runs from the PM to the Executive Council, with no intermediate coordination layer.

For international institutions, the practical effect is simpler escalation. Disputes, approvals, or policy questions that previously might have navigated both bodies now have a single institutional address.

DPM Thang Takes Direct Ownership#

Deputy PM Nguyen Van Thang is named Executive Council Chairman. His appointment gives the VIFC a more senior political sponsor than the centre has held to date — and concentrates cross-border fintech ambitions in a single official. DPM Thang has separately proposed a feasibility study for an ASEAN fintech sandbox, which, if pursued, would sit within the same governance structure he now chairs.

The Ministry of Finance is designated as the VIFC's permanent lead agency — responsible for advising the Executive Council, coordinating across ministries, monitoring implementation, and proposing new mechanisms. This is the first time MoF's lead role has been confirmed in a PM-level conclusion rather than implied by its ministerial portfolio. For foreign institutions seeking a single interlocutor for tax, product approval, and regulatory questions, MoF is now formally that institution.

The One-Body-vs-Two-Bodies Question#

The most consequential element of the June 2 conclusions is the question PM Le Minh Hung put on the table — and the August deadline he attached to it.

MoF must report to the PM on the optimal organizational model: a single central-level executive body with national authority over the VIFC, or two separate bodies, one for Ho Chi Minh City and one for Da Nang. The report is due in August.

This is a direct challenge to the two-node architecture that Decree 323 established. Under the current framework, HCMC and Da Nang operate as distinct VIFC zones — each covering defined geographic areas, with HCMC's zone spanning approximately 898 hectares as defined in Decree 323 — and each city retains a degree of local operational autonomy.

A single central-level body would replace that arrangement with national-level governance, likely concentrated in a Hanoi-based or centrally-appointed agency. Two bodies would preserve local autonomy but formalize the competitive dynamic between cities that the June 2 conclusions explicitly warn against.

The PM's concern about internal competition is not incidental. HCMC and Da Nang are required to deliver long-term development strategies to the Executive Council in June, with each city clearly defining its role. The explicit instruction — avoid competition and resource waste — signals that the PM views the current two-node dynamic as carrying real coordination risk.

What This Means for Da Nang#

Da Nang faces the sharper exposure from the August decision. If MoF recommends a single central-level body, Da Nang's VIFC operational autonomy could be absorbed into a unified national structure, reducing the city to an implementation zone rather than an independent node with its own governance track.

Institutions that have committed to Da Nang's VIFC — or are evaluating it as a secondary node — face a material planning uncertainty. The Da Nang FTZ is attracting infrastructure capital, and Da Nang's investment environment has drawn FDI interest — but the city's VIFC governance status could look materially different by September.

Operating Timeline#

The June 2 conclusions establish a compressed delivery schedule:

• Before June 10: MoF submits an Executive Council restructuring plan to the PM. This deadline has likely already passed; whether it was met is not yet confirmed in available sources.
• Before June 15: HCMC finalizes operational regulations and submits them to the Executive Council Chairman for promulgation — a follow-through on the supervisory body mandate tracked in the VIFC supervisory body article. This deadline has also passed as of this article's publication date; confirmation of on-schedule promulgation is pending, consistent with the same uncertainty noted for the June 10 milestone.
• June: HCMC and Da Nang submit long-term development strategies to the Executive Council, delineating each city's role.
• August: MoF reports to the PM on the optimal organizational model.

The sequence is tight. Operational regulations for HCMC need to be in place before the organizational model question is resolved — meaning the rules governing the approximately 898-hectare HCMC zone may be written under one assumption about governance and then administered under another.

Product Priorities Unchanged#

The June 2 conclusions reaffirm the product sequencing that the PM outlined in the June 13 product directive: government bonds, local government bonds, infrastructure bonds, fintech products, digital assets, and trade and investment products. Capital is to be directed toward transport, seaports, airports, and energy infrastructure. MoF and the State Bank of Vietnam are tasked with developing inspection and supervision mechanisms by product type.

This reaffirmation adds governance context to the product mandate: MoF, now formally the lead agency, is simultaneously responsible for both the regulatory framework governing each product and the organizational model that determines who administers it.

What to Watch#

The August MoF report is the next material event in the VIFC governance sequence. Three things will determine whether it resolves or prolongs uncertainty:

Whether MoF recommends consolidation. A recommendation for a single central-level body would require a structural change to the Decree 323 architecture — potentially including a new decree or amendment — and would directly affect Da Nang's VIFC standing.

Whether HCMC's June 15 operational regulations were promulgated on schedule. Confirmation remains pending as of publication. Delays at that step would push operational readiness further into Q3, compressing the window between when the rules exist and when the organizational model is decided.

Whether the long-term city strategies delineate roles clearly enough to avoid the competition the PM flagged. If HCMC and Da Nang submit overlapping or vague strategies, the August report's recommendation may lean toward centralization as a coordination solution rather than as a policy preference.

For institutions still deciding whether to apply for VIFC membership — and which node to anchor in — the August deadline is the next major planning marker. The governance architecture will not be fully settled before it passes.